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21. Introduction
Economic growth and employment creation are twin horns of not just the European dilemma
but of what looms as the major challenge confronting the West. Over 10 percent of the work force
in the European Union was unemployed in 1999. Individual countries have responded to the twin
horns of the growth-employment dilemma with a broad spectrum of policy approaches. Led by
France and Germany, continental European countries have generally pursued policies of
maintaining the status quo economic models, while the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have
been bolder at modifying their economic models.
This divergence of policy approaches across countries is new. In the first three post-war
decades, the countries of Western Europe and North America pursued economic policies, although
not identical, which had a high degree of similarity. As Galbraith (1956) articulated, something of a
convergence had taken place throughout the Western economies in the way that the model of
“managed capitalism” was developing. It seemed that all countries were converging toward
economies dominated by a handful of powerful enterprises, constrained only by the countervailing
powers of the state and workers.1 The 1950s and 1960s were an era of high and increasing
concentration of economic activity. Perhaps the ascendancy of industrial organization as a field in
economics during this period came from the need to address what became known as the
concentration question. The scholars of industrial organization responded by producing a mass of
literature focusing on essentially three issues: (i) how much economic concentration actually exists?
(ii) what are the economic welfare implications of an oligopolistic market structure? and (iii) given
the evidence that economic concentration is associated with efficiency, what are the public policy
implications? Oliver Williamson’s classic 1968 article, “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Trade-offs,” became something of a final statement demonstrating what appeared to be an
inevitable trade-off between the gains in productive efficiency that could be obtained through
increased concentration and gains in terms of competition, and implicitly democracy, that could be
achieved through decentralizing policies.
The fundamental issue of public policy at that time was how to live with this apparent trade-
off between concentration and efficiency on the one hand, and decentralization and democracy on
the other.  The public policy question of the day was, How can society reap the benefits of the large
corporation in an oligopolistic setting while avoiding or at least minimizing the costs imposed by a
concentration of economic power? The policy response was to constrain the freedom of firms to
contract. Such policy restraints typically took the form of public ownership, regulation and
competition policy or antitrust. At the time, considerable attention was devoted to what seemed like
glaring differences in policy approaches to this apparent trade-off by different countries. France and
Sweden resorted to government ownership of private business. Other countries, such as the
Netherlands and Germany, tended to emphasize regulation. Still other countries, such as the Untied
States, had a greater emphasis on antitrust. In fact, most countries relied upon elements of all three
policy instruments. While the particular instrument may have varied across countries, they were, in
fact, manifestations of a singular policy approach – how to restrict and restrain the power of the
large corporation. What may have been perceived as a disparate set of policies at the time appears in
retrospect to comprise a remarkably singular policy approach – a managed economy.
Quantitative and qualitative changes in the job market were the first hint of a shifting
economic system (Siebert, 1997 and Blanchard and Katz, 1997). One manifestation has been a
divergence in job creation and reduction of unemployment across countries, between the
                                                                
1 This view was certainly represented in the influential book written by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in 1968, The
American Challenge.
3forerunners that have shifted towards a newly emerging economy, like the Netherlands, Denmark
and the United Kingdom, and the laggards still obsessed with perfecting the managed economy, like
Germany, or rethinking the managed economy, like France (Nickell, 1997). This newly emerging
economy we will term as the entrepreneurial economy. Why have the policies central to the
entrepreneurial economy, such as deregulation, privatization and labor market flexibility not
diffused rapidly to other countries still burdened with unemployment and stagnant growth? As the
OECD points out in the 1997 Employment Outlook, “the failure of continental European countries
to adopt its recommendations reflects their fear of increased earnings inequality. The question is
whether it is possible to deregulate without suffering these malign effects.” The problem is that the
alleged benefits from structural change are accompanied only at a perceived cost in terms of
important economic goals, such as income equality, the social safety net, a high level of public
goods available to all, and a high level of mean wages. To reap the gains from structural change in
terms of greater competitiveness, economic growth, and ultimately increased employment demands
a loss, or at least a perceived loss of certain other economic policy goals.
In response to the rising unemployment coupled with the stagnant growth of the past decade,
this singular policy approach has broken down. The consequences of economic restructuring are
enormous and encompass virtually every dimension of economic life. To characterize fundamental
differences between the old and emerging systems is a formidable task for both policy makers as
well as scholars. While traces of this shift can be found in different lines of research across a broad
spectrum of fields within and beyond economics, there are also insightful references in the popular
press as well as the political debate addressing the most pressing policy issues of our day. Many of
these references are under the rubric of The New Economy. In response to their direct accountability
to the public, policy makers have been quicker to acknowledge the emergence of changing
economic forces. Although politicians and policy makers have made a plea for guidance in the era
of entrepreneurship, scholars have been slower to respond. The purpose of this paper is to make a
first step in identifying and articulating these differences and to suggest that a fundamental shift in
Europe, along with the other OECD countries, is taking place. This shift is from the managed
economy to the entrepreneurial economy. We do this by contrasting the most fundamental elements
of the newly emerging entrepreneurial economy with those of the managed economy. Contrasting
the managed economy with the entrepreneurial economy is not, however, symmetric. While
scholars have accumulated decades of meticulous research documenting, analyzing and explaining
the many manifestations of the managed economy, the entrepreneurial economy is sufficiently new
and still incipient as to preclude anything approaching comparable scholarship. Thus, while we are
able to stand on the shoulders of giants when describing the managed economy, systematic
knowledge about the emerging entrepreneurial economy remains more limited. The aim of this
paper is to motivate subsequent research by outlining some of the main differences between the
two. We do this by contrasting the most fundamental elements of the newly emerging
entrepreneurial economy with those of the managed economy. Fourteen trade-offs confronting these
two polar worlds are identified. The common thread throughout these trade-offs is the increased
role of new and small enterprises in the entrepreneurial economy.
We speculate that these fourteen trade-offs are all manifestations of a shifting source of
comparative advantage away from capital and labor towards knowledge-based economic activity.
Just as the comparative advantage in economic activity based on capital and labor rendered the
managed economy as an appropriate response, the shift to knowledge-based economic activity is the
driving force underlying the emergence of the entrepreneurial economy. While the requisite
research to validate or refute this conjecture remains to be undertaken, the point of this article is to
suggest not only that a systematic and pervasive set of distinct manifestations differentiate the
managed economy from the emerging entrepreneurial economy, but also that these differences are
profound and fundamental in nature. This article is therefore more descriptive in nature and calls
4upon the analytical contributions from a broad range of other studies to weave together a consistent
framework in differentiating the entrepreneurial from the managed economy.
2. The Trade-offs
The managed economy, as characterized by Chandler (1977 and 1990), thrived for nearly
three-quarters of a century. Why has an alternative system, which we term as the entrepreneurial
economy emerged? The answer has to do with globalization. While globalization is a
multidimensional phenomenon encompassing a broad spectrum of economic and social dimensions,
virtually all measures of trade, foreign direct investment and integration indicate a sharp increase in
recent years. For example, Figure 1 shows that trade has become increasingly important over time
for the United States. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that foreign direct investment is also gaining in
importance.
Figure 1
Source: Economic Report of the President (February, 1998), taken from http://www.neweconomyindex.org/index.html
Figure 2
Source: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment-United
States, Paris, 1995, taken from http://www.neweconomyindex.org/index.html
5The emergence of the entrepreneurial economy is a response to two fundamental aspects of
globalization. The first is the advent of low-cost but highly skilled competition in Central and
Eastern Europe as well as Asia. The second is the telecommunications and microprocessor
revolution, which has greatly reduced the cost of shifting standardized economic activity out of
high-cost locations, such as Europe and into lower-cost locations elsewhere in the world.
A consequence of globalization is that the comparative advantage of high-wage countries is
no longer compatible with routinized economic activity, which can be easily transferred to lower-
cost regions outside Western Europe. Maintenance of high wages requires knowledge-based
economic activity that cannot be costlessly diffused across geographic space. The first group of
trade-offs we examine focuses on characterizing the forces underlying the managed and
entrepreneurial economies. This group consists of three trade-offs. The first is between localization
and globalization. The second trade-off is between change and continuity. Change goes together
with knowledge based activity and knowledge based activity results in innovations that are more
radical and less incremental. An inherent characteristic of knowledge is high uncertainty, which
individuals assess differently. Differences in the evaluation of knowledge result in an increased role
of new and small firms. Small firms were viewed negatively in the managed economy because their
sub-optimal size imposed a less efficient use of resources. The third trade-off of this group
compares the view that increased employment requires a reduction in wages with the view in the
entrepreneurial economy that higher wages can accompany increased employment.
The second group also consists of three trade-offs, which characterize differences in the
underlying environment. Turbulence, diversity and heterogeneity are central to the entrepreneurial
economy. By contrast, stability, continuity and homogeneity were the cornerstones of the managed
economy. These differences are examined in trade-offs four, five and six.
There are four trade-offs in the fourth group, which focuses on how firms function in the
entrepreneurial and managed economies. Trade-off seven examines motivation versus control. The
boundary between the firm and the industry is the subject of trade-off eight – market exchange
versus firm transaction. The interface between firms is the focus of trade-off nine, where
competition and co-operation are viewed as complements or substitutes. The tenth trade-offs
focuses on the roles of flexibility and scale economies.
The final group consists of four trade-offs involving government policy. They cover the goal
of policy (stimulation versus regulation), the target of policy (inputs versus outputs), the locus of
policy (local versus national), and financing policy.
2.1. Localization versus Globalization
The meaning of geographic space differs between the entrepreneurial and managed
economy. In the managed economy, the standardization of products and production reduces the
importance of regional-specific characteristics and idiosyncrasies. This is because of the difference
in the most important factors of production between the managed and entrepreneurial economies.
As represented by the neo-classical production function, production in the managed economy
results from the inputs of land, labor and capital (Romer, 1992). While these traditional inputs still
play a role in the entrepreneurial economy, knowledge has emerged as the most important factor of
production. A recent literature from the new growth theory argues that knowledge differs inherently
from the traditional factors of production in that it cannot be costlessly transferred across
geographic space (Krugman, 1991a and 1991b and Lucas, 1993). This is why under the
entrepreneurial economy geography plays a more important role in that knowledge tends to be
developed in the contexts of localized production networks embedded in innovative clusters.
6In rediscovering the importance of economic geography, Paul Krugman (1991a, p. 5) asks,
"What is the most striking feature of
the geography of economic activity?
The short answer is surely
concentration...production is
remarkably concentrated in space."
Perhaps in response to Krugman's
concern, a literature in economics has
recently emerged which focuses on the
implications of the spatial
concentration of economic activity for
economic growth. Theoretical models
posited by Romer (1990), Lucas
(1993), and Krugman (1991a and
1991b) link increasing returns to scale
yielded by externalities within a
geographically bounded region to
higher rates of growth. The empirical evidence clearly suggests that R&D and other sources of
knowledge not only generate externalities, but also that such knowledge spillovers tend to be
geographically bounded within the region where the new economic knowledge was created
(Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson,
1993 and Jaffe, 1989). That is, new economic knowledge may spill over, but the geographic extent
of such knowledge spillovers is limited.2
As Figure 3 shows, internet use has exploded in the last decade. The importance of location
and geographic proximity in a world increasingly dominated by E-mail, fax machines, and
electronic communications superhighways may seem surprising and even paradoxical at first
glance. After all, the new telecommunications technologies have triggered a virtual spatial
revolution in terms of the geography of production.
The resolution of this paradox lies in the distinction between knowledge and information.
While the marginal cost of transmitting information may be invariant to distance, presumably the
marginal cost of transmitting knowledge, and especially tacit knowledge, rises with distance. Von
Hipple (1994) demonstrates that high context, uncertain knowledge, or what he terms as sticky
knowledge, is best transmitted via face-to-face interaction and through frequent contact. Proximity
matters in transmitting knowledge because as Kenneth Arrow (1962) pointed out some three
decades ago, tacit knowledge is inherently non-rival in nature, and knowledge developed for any
particular application can easily spill over and be applied for different purposes. Similarly, Zvi
Griliches (1992, p. 29) has defined knowledge spillovers as "working on similar things and hence
benefiting much from each other's research." As Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992)
have observed, "intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans
                                                                
2 An important finding of Jaffe (1989) and Audretsch and Feldman (1996) is that investment in R&D by private
corporations and universities spills over for economic exploitation by third-party firms. In these studies the knowledge
production function was modified where the innovative activity within a geographical unit of observation -- a state --
was related to the private corporate expenditures on R&D within that state as well as the research expenditures
undertaken at universities. Not only was innovative activity found to increase in the presence of high private corporate
expenditures on R&D, but also as a result of research expenditures undertaken by universities within the geographic
area. In order to explicitly identify the recipients of R&D spillovers, Acs, Audretsch and Feldman (1994) estimated
separate knowledge production functions for large and small firms. Their results suggested that the innovative output of
all firms rises along with an increase in the amount of R&D inputs, in both private corporations and university
laboratories. However, R&D expenditures made by private companies play a particularly important role in providing
inputs to the innovative activity of large firms; and expenditures on research made by universities serve as an especially
key input for generating innovative activity in small enterprises.
 
7and continents." Stephan (1996) explains the role that working together in close proximity plays in
generating new breakthroughs in science.3
The dichotomy between knowledge and information does not contradict globalization.
However, globalization has not had symmetric impacts on knowledge and information. On the one
hand, globalization has made it possible to transfer information costlessly across geographic space.
On the other hand, the geographic dimension of knowledge remains a local phenomenon, largely
unchanged by globalization. Thus, globalization has exerted a powerful shift on the relative prices
of obtaining information and knowledge. While the relative cost of obtaining information has been
drastically reduced, the cost of obtaining knowledge remains largely unchanged. This change in the
relative prices of knowledge and information has triggered a shift in comparative advantage.
Under the managed economy, the traditional factors of land, labor and capital are
predominant as sources of comparative advantage. This was clearly the case in mass production
where abundance of capital determined the comparative advantage (Chandler, 1977). Local
characteristics and regional idiosyncrasies are irrelevant as a knowledge source and therefore as a
source of competitive advantage. In the managed economy, geography provides a platform to
combine mobile capital with (immobile) lower-cost labor (Kindleberger and Audretsch, 1983). In
the entrepreneurial economy the comparative advantage is based on innovative activity. An
important source of this innovative activity is knowledge spillovers that cannot be easily diffused
across geographic space. Local characteristics and regional idiosyncrasies provide a rich source of
new knowledge in the entrepreneurial economy. The so-called death of distance resulting from
globalization has shifted the comparative advantage of high-cost locations towards economic
activity that cannot be costlessly diffused across geographic space. The creation and spillover of
tacit knowledge is a localized phenomenon. Thus, in the entrepreneurial economy local proximity
and regions have emerged as an important locus of economic activity.
2.2. Change versus Continuity
Cohen and Klepper (1992) identify an inherent trade-off between change on the one hand
and continuity on the other. While the managed economy depended upon continuity (Chandler,
1977), the entrepreneurial economy provokes and thrives on change. Cohen and Klepper’s (1992)
theory extends the work of Richard Nelson (1981) about the importance of competition and
diversity for technological change. Seen through the lens of evolutionary economics (Nelson and
Winter, 1982) there are two key dimensions involved in the process of technological change --
diversity and selection. The technological competence of each firm results in a particular
technological trajectory. Innovative activity is generally within the boundaries established by the
firm’s core competence and its technological trajectory. Such innovative activity within the
technological paradigm established by the firm’s core competence provides the basis of continuity
in the managed economy.
As Cohen and Klepper (1992) point out, large firms have a greater incentive to invest in
R&D because they are better able to appropriate the returns through greater output and sales. At the
same time they do not have a large incentive to try to extend innovative activity beyond the
boundaries imposed by their technological trajectories. According to Cohen and Klepper (1992, p.
2), “Dividing up industry output over a greater number of small firms increases the chances that any
given approach to innovation will be pursued, thereby increasing the diversity of technological
efforts in the industry. While increasing the number of firms does not necessarily benefit individual
                                                                
3 The dichotomy between information and tacit knowledge does not mirror the more traditional dichotomy between
high and low technology industries. Just as there are aspects of high technology industries that are well defined and
standardized and can therefore be outsourced, there are also elements of low technology industries that are not well
defined and cannot be outsourced. For example, certain types of software programming is outsourced to India and
Eastern Europe, while the genesis for ideas in entertainment clusters in just several locations.
8firms in the industry, it promotes technical advance and, hence, benefits society by increasing the
number of productive approaches to innovation that are collectively pursued in the industry. From
this perspective, the source of the social advantage associated with small firm size is not smallness
per se but the greater number of firms that small size implies given some industry demand.” Thus,
in the entrepreneurial economy, decentralized decision-making in an industrial structure comprised
of smaller firms leads to a greater diversity of approaches. This diversity, in turn, generates greater
opportunities for breaking out of the boundaries imposed by the lock-in along technological
trajectories and ultimately to hit it big.
Concentrating knowledge resources in just several firms in the managed economy results in
a concentration of innovative activity within just several technological trajectories. By contrast,
unleashing knowledge by letting loose a horde of independent agents – deconcentration -- in the
entrepreneurial economy, results in a greater diversity of approaches across a broad range of
technological trajectories. Which is more efficient? If the degree of uncertainty is relatively low,
then concentrating knowledge results may result in greater technological change. But as the degree
of uncertainty increases, a diversity of approaches, represented by a multiplicity of technological
trajectories, becomes more important.
Innovation is present under both change and continuity. However, the locus of innovative
activity differs considerably between the managed and entrepreneurial economies. This difference is
shaped by a distinction between incremental and radical innovations. Innovations can be considered
to be incremental when that they are compatible with the core competence and technological
trajectory of the firm (Teece, Rumult, Dosi and Winter, 1994).4 The implementation of such
incremental innovations does not require significant change in the firm or its personnel. By contrast,
a radical innovation can be defined as extending beyond the boundaries of the core competence and
technological trajectory of the firm. Both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence support the
notion that firms are characterized by technological lock-in. Theoretically, implementation of a
radical innovation would require significant changes in the firm and its personnel. As Hannan and
Freeman (1989) conclude, “We assume that individual organizations are characterized by relative
inertia in structure.” Empirically, a rich set of case studies provide compelling evidence that
incumbent firms tend to suffer from technological lock-in (Christenson, 2000) and Henderson and
Clark, 1990)The managed economy was designed to absorb change within a given technological
paradigm, and hence, the typical firm excelled at incremental innovation. By contrast, in the
entrepreneurial economy, the capacity to break out of the technological lock-in imposed by existing
paradigms is enhanced. Incumbent firms may still be subject to technological lock-in in the
entrepreneurial economy, just as they were under the managed economy. However, the ability for
individuals and groups of individuals to break out of the existing technological trajectories by
starting a new firm is a fundamental characteristic differentiating the entrepreneurial from the
managed economy. The main mechanism for breaking out of a locked-in technology is the ability of
economic agents to start new firms. The firm’s technological trajectory may be locked-in, but new
technological trajectories are started as new firms are created.
The industry life-cycle theory introduced by Raymond Vernon (1966) is typically
considered to link trade and foreign direct investment to the stage of the life cycle. There do not
appear to be direct implications for the relevance of radical versus incremental innovations. But a
more thoughtful examination of the framework of the industry life cycle suggests that the relative
importance of radical versus incremental innovations is shaped by the industry life cycle.
There have been various versions of what actually constitutes the industry life cycle. For
example, Oliver Williamson (1975, pp. 215-216) has depicted the industry life cycle as, “Three
stages in an industry’s development are commonly recognized: an early exploratory stage, an
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9intermediate development stage, and a mature stage. The first or early formative stage involves the
supply of a new product of relatively primitive design, manufactured on comparatively
unspecialized machinery, and marketed through a variety of exploratory techniques. Volume is
typically low. A high degree of uncertainty characterizes business experience at this stage. The
second stage is the intermediate development state in which manufacturing techniques are more
refined and market definition is sharpened, output grows rapidly in response to newly recognized
applications and unsatisfied market demands. A high but somewhat lesser degree of uncertainty
characterizes market outcomes at this stage. The third stage is that of a mature industry.
Management, manufacturing, and marketing techniques all reach a relatively advanced degree of
refinement. Markets may continue to grow, but do so at a more regular and predictable
rate…established connections, with customers and suppliers (including capital market access) all
operate to buffer changes and thereby to limit large shifts in market shares. Significant innovations
tend to be fewer and are mainly of an improvement variety.”
While not explicitly stated by Vernon (1966) or Williamson (1975), the role of R&D does
not stay constant over the industry life cycle. As Klepper (1996) shows, in the early stages of the
life cycle, R&D tends to be highly productive, so that there are increasing returns to R&D. In
addition, the costs of radical innovation tend to be relatively low while the cost of incremental
innovation and imitation tend to be relatively low. Because innovation in newly emerging industries
tends to be more radical and less incremental, it is more costly to diffuse across geographic space
for economic application in lower-cost locations.
By contrast, as an industry evolves over the life cycle, the cost of radical innovation tends to
increase relative to the cost of incremental innovation and imitation. Strong diminishing returns to
radical innovative activity set in. This is not the case for incremental innovation and especially
imitation. An implication is that it requires an increasing amount of R&D effort to generate a given
amount of innovative activity as an industry matures over the life cycle. At the same time, it
requires a decreasing amount of R&D expenditures to transfer new technology to lower cost
locations, because innovation activity tends to become less radical and more incremental (Dosi,
1982 and 1988 and Nelson, 1990 and 1995).
This means that information generated by R&D in mature industries can be transferred to
lower-cost locations for economic commercialization. By contrast, the knowledge resulting from
R&D in newly emerging industries cannot be easily transferred to lower-cost locations for
economic commercialization. The reason for the asymmetry between the ability to transfer the
product of R&D lies in the inherent distinction between information and knowledge described
above. Since R&D generates tacit knowledge in the earlier stages of the life cycle, geographic
proximity plays a more important role, since it generates information in the mature stages
geographic proximity plays less of a role and a greater share of the economic activity can be
outsourced. Thus, under the managed economy incremental innovative activity along with diffusion
played a more important role. This type of innovative activity, while often requiring large
investments of R&D, generated incremental changes in products along the existing technological
trajectories. In the entrepreneurial economy, the comparative advantage of the high-cost location
demands innovative activity earlier in the life cycle. Early stage innovative activity consists of
radical innovation, which is more involved in creating and developing new technological
trajectories rather than following existing technological trajectories.
2.3. Jobs and High Wages versus Jobs or High Wages
One of the most striking policy dilemmas in the managed economy was that unemployment
could be reduced only at the cost of lower wages. In the entrepreneurial economy the choice is less
ambiguous. High employment can be combined with high wages, just as low wages do not
necessarily imply high employment.
10
The policy dilemma between employment creation and wage levels was the response to the
wave of corporate downsizing, which has left virtually no OECD country untouched. The United
States Labor Department recently reported that as a result of corporate downsizing more than 40
million jobs have disappeared in the United States since 1979. This includes over twenty million
blue-collar jobs and somewhat fewer than twenty million white-collar jobs. Between 1980 and
1993, the 500 largest U.S. manufacturing corporations cut nearly five million jobs, or one quarter of
their work force (Audretsch, 1995). The rate of corporate downsizing has apparently increased over
time. During most of the 1980s, about one in 25 workers lost a job. In the 1990s this has risen to
one in 20 workers. Such downsizing has not been unique to the United States but has become
increasingly rampant throughout Europe.
If corporate downsizing has been rampant throughout OECD countries, why is there such a
large variance in unemployment rates? For example, unemployment in the United States, United
Kingdom and the Netherlands has actually been falling. How can these seemingly incompatible
phenomena be reconciled? Because the more entrepreneurial economies have been more successful
at creating new jobs to compensate for jobs lost to corporate downsizing. It is small firms in
general, and new firm start-ups in particular that have been the locomotive of employment
creation. 5 For example, Audretsch (1995) found that 1.3 million new jobs in manufacturing were in
fact created by small firms between 1976 and 1986, while the number of large manufacturing jobs
actually decreased by 100,000. Subsequently, between 1987 and 1992, small companies (with fewer
than 500) employees created all of the 5.8 million new jobs in the United States. Over that same
period, large companies recorded a net loss of 2.3 million jobs
Konings (1995) found that for the United Kingdom there is a negative relationship between
gross job creation and plant size but a positive one between gross job destruction and plant size.
Robson and Gallagher (1994) show that about one-third of all new employment in the United
Kingdom between 1971 and 1981 was in firms with fewer than twenty employees. In the 1980s
nearly one-half of all jobs were created in such firms (although they accounted for about one-fifth
of total employment in 1985). And between 1987 and 1991 large firms in the United Kingdom, like
their counterparts in the United States, were net job shedders. Small firms contributed all of the new
employment. Hughes (1993) provides evidence suggesting that this was in part due to downsizing
of the largest firms in the economy, and in part due to an actual expansion of economic activity
contributed by small firms. Baldwin and Picot (1995) have found virtually identical results for
Canada.
                                                                
5 The literature on employment generation and firm size can be found in Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996a and
1996b) and Carree and Klomp (1996).
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Table 1: Entrepreneurship rate in OECD countries, 1974-1998
  Level  Growth  
 1974 1986 1998 1986-74 1998-86
Austria 0.081 0.066 0.080 -0.015 0.013
Belgium 0.100 0.106 0.119 0.005 0.013
Denmark 0.081 0.063 0.064 -0.018 0.001
Finland 0.062 0.066 0.082 0.004 0.015
France 0.109 0.098 0.085 -0.011 -0.012
Germany (West) 0.073 0.069 0.085 -0.004 0.016
Greece* 0.173 0.182 0.186 0.009 0.003
Ireland 0.073 0.078 0.112 0.004 0.034
Italy 0.144 0.167 0.182 0.023 0.015
Luxembourg* 0.100 0.078 0.059 -0.022 -0.019
The Netherlands 0.097 0.082 0.104 -0.015 0.022
Portugal* 0.110 0.108 0.152 -0.002 0.044
Spain 0.116 0.115 0.130 -0.001 0.015
Sweden 0.071 0.066 0.082 -0.005 0.016
United Kingdom 0.077 0.089 0.109 0.012 0.020
Iceland 0.102 0.099 0.132 -0.004 0.033
Norway 0.092 0.084 0.071 -0.008 -0.014
Switzerland 0.065 0.070 0.091 0.005 0.021
USA 0.082 0.103 0.103 0.021 0.000
Japan 0.127 0.125 0.100 -0.002 -0.024
Canada 0.075 0.100 0.141 0.025 0.041
Australia 0.137 0.165 0.155 0.028 -0.011
New Zealand 0.098 0.110 0.142 0.012 0.032
Average 0.098 0.100 0.111
Note: The sources of the data are OECD figures, adapted by EIM to improve upon international
comparability. A star (*) for 1998 means provisional. Agriculture is excluded. Germany is West-Germany for
1974 and 1986. The total number of business owners for all countries in 1974, 1986 and 1998 are 30,337,
38,446 and 44,927, respectively (in thousands). The data set is referred to as COMPENDIA 2000.1. For
further information contact André van Stel at EIM (ast@eim.nl).
Table 1 shows that there has been considerable disparity among OECD countries in business
ownership rates both across countries and over time. The magnitude of this shift and speed of
adjustment varies considerably across countries. Econometric evidence undertaken by Audretsch,
Carree, van Stel and Thurik (forthcoming) suggests that those countries that have shifted industry
structure towards smaller firms in a more rapid fashion have been rewarded by higher growth rates.
See also Thurik (1996), Carree and Thurik (1998 and 1999) and Audretsch and Thurik (2000).
While systematic empirical evidence has been gathered across a broad range of countries
documenting that small firms generate most of the new jobs, similar studies also provide
compelling evidence that small firms are also a large source of job destruction. Taken together,
these studies suggest that the industrial structure has become more turbulent (Caves, 1998).
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In the managed economy, the job creation contributed by small firms was associated with
lower wages. There is a large body of consistent empirical evidence linking the size of a firm to
wages. Probably the most cited study is that of Brown, Hamilton and Medoff (1990, pp. 88-89),
who conclude that, “Workers in large firms earn higher wages, and this fact cannot be explained
completely by differences in labor quality, industry, working conditions, or union status. Workers in
large firms also enjoy better benefits and greater job security than their counterparts in small firms.
When these factors are added together, it appears that workers in large firms do have a superior
employment package.”
This apparent trade-off between wages and employment is the result of static, cross-section
studies taken at a single point in time. A different picture emerges when a dynamic analysis is
introduced. This dynamic analysis suggests that, in knowledge-based industries, people start firms
to pursue new but uncertain ideas. The only way they can discover if these new ideas are viable is
through the trial-and-error experience provided by the market (Jovanovic, 1982; Pakes and Ericson,
1998 and Ericson and Pakes, 1995). They subsequently learn, or discover, through experience,
whether or not the idea is viable. If it is viable, the firm will survive and grow. If it is not viable the
firm stagnates and ultimately exits. An important line of research, spanning a broad spectrum of
time periods and countries supports this dynamic view of industries (Geroski, 1995 and Caves,
1998). Start-up activity is high in almost every OECD country. Audretsch (1995) has shown that it
is greater in industries where there is a higher degree of uncertainty than in industries where there is
less uncertainty. In addition, there is systematic evidence that negative relationships exist between
firm age and growth, and firm size and growth, as well as positive relationships between firm size
and the likelihood of survival, and firm age and the likelihood of survival (Geroski, 1995). This
evidence supports the dynamic view of industries that people start firms to experiment with new
ideas. Most of these experiments fail, but some succeed, resulting in lower survival rates but high
growth rates of the new entrants.
Recent research based on longitudinal data sets, shows that the wages and productivity of
new firms in knowledge-based industries increase as the firm ages (Audretsch, van Leeuwen,
Menkveld and Thurik, forthcoming and Baldwin, 1995). This implies that, as new firms mature, the
small low wage firm of today becomes the high wage firm of tomorrow. Similarly, the small low
productivity firm of today becomes the high productivity firm of tomorrow (Baily, Bartelsman and
Haltiwanger, 1996). New and small firms are in motion. Through growth new firms generate not
just greater employment but also higher wages. The growth of new firms ensures that the greater
employment does not come at a cost of lower wages, but rather the opposite – higher wages. Thus,
while small firms generated employment at a cost of lower wages in the managed economy, in the
entrepreneurial economy small firms create both more jobs and higher wages.
2.4. Turbulence versus Stability
The managed economy of the post-war period was characterized by remarkable stability.
This stability is characterized by product homogeneity and durability of demand, resulting in a
constant population of firms, and a low turnover rate of both jobs and workers. This stability was
conducive to mass production. Just as Taylorism provided a managerial mechanism for ensuring the
stability and reliability of workers in the production process, competition focused on the dimension
of prices but not necessarily product differentiation (Chandler, 1977).
In the 1950s and 1960s it took two decades to replace one-third of the Fortune 500. In the
1970s it took one decade. And in the 1980s one-third of the Fortune 500 firms were replaced within
just five years. Perhaps even more impressive than the handful of new enterprises that grow to
penetrate the Fortune 500 are the armies of start-ups that come into existence each year -- and
typically disappear into oblivion within a few years. In the 1990s there are around 1.3 million new
companies started each year (Audretsch, 1995). That is, the entrepreneurial economy is
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characterized by a tremendous degree of turbulence. It is an economy in motion, with a massive
number of new firms entering each year, but only a subset surviving for any length of time, and an
even smaller subset that can ultimately challenge and displace the incumbent large enterprises.
Why is the entrepreneurial economy characterized by less stability and more turbulence?
The answer has to do with the sources and commercialization of new ideas. As Nelson and Winter
(1982) emphasize, the role of diversity and selection has been at the heart of generating change. The
process of creating diverse ideas and selecting across these diverse ideas is important in both the
managed and entrepreneurial economies. However, what differs is the management and
organization of the process by which diversity is created as well as the selection mechanism. In the
managed economy, research activities are organized and scheduled in departments devoted towards
novel products and services. The management of change fitted into what Nelson and Winter (1982)
call the routines of a firm. According to Schumpeter (1942, p. 132), “Innovation itself is being
reduced to routine. Technological progress is increasingly becoming the business of teams of
trained specialists who turn out what is required and make it work in predictable ways.” The ability
of the existing corporations to manage the process of change pre-empted any opportunities for
entrepreneurs to start new firms. This meant that relatively few firms were started and few firms
failed, resulting in a remarkably stable industrial structure. Chandler (1990) examined the largest
200 firms in the United States, Britain and Germany over the first half of this century and found that
they maintained a remarkably stable position. Teece (1993, p. 214) interprets these findings:
“Chandler’s data on rankings of the largest industrial firms (for 1917, 1930, 1948 for Great Britain;
1913, 1928, 1953 for Germany) indicate considerable stability in rankings – at least as compared to
what economic theory would predict. The firms that were leaders (as measured by asset size) in
their industrial groupings often remained there over long periods.” Similarly, the share of total U.S.
manufacturing assets accounted for by the largest 100 corporations increased from about 36 percent
in 1924, to 39 percent after the Second World War to over 50 percent by the end of the 1960s. This
development caused Scherer (1970, p. 44) to state that, “Despite the (statistical) uncertainties, one
thing is clear. The increasing domestic dominance of the 100 largest manufacturing firms since
1947 is not a statistical illusion.” Similarly, Dennis Mueller (1989) has shown that the profits of the
largest corporations tended to persist in the long run during the post-war period.
In the entrepreneurial economy, the process of generating new ideas, both within and outside
of R&D laboratories, creates a diversity of opinions about the value of these new ideas. Differences
in the evaluation of new ideas, leads individual agents to pursue their commercialization external to
the established firm in the form of a new independent venture. The diversity of new ideas and
experiments with their commercialization manifests itself external as well as internal to incumbent
firms. The selection between viable and non-viable ideas is then the result of the market process and
not restricted to internal decisions imposed by decision-making hierarchies. The drive to
appropriate the expected value of knowledge embodied in individual economic agents results in
commercialization of ideas in the form of new firms. But not all of these start-ups are successful. A
large body of empirical studies shows (Geroski, 1994) that (1) start-up rates are greater in
innovative industries than in non-innovative industries, and (2) the likelihood of survival is lower in
innovative industries6. Audretsch (1995) finds that one-third of all U.S. manufacturing firms are less
than six years old. However, these new start-ups account for only 5 percent of total manufacturing
employment. Taken together, this evidence provides a view of the entrepreneurial economy as
being remarkably turbulent, in that a large number of firms are started each year, while only a few
of the firms actually survive beyond a decade, and an even fewer number of those new firms grow
sufficiently to challenge the incumbents.
It is not just enterprises that are more turbulent in the entrepreneurial economy, but also both
jobs and the commitments between firms and workers. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)
                                                                
6 For a study of the services see Audretsch, Klomp and Thurik (1999).
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document a marked increase in the degree of worker turnover in the United States over a long
period of time. At the same time, labor contracts have become more targeted towards specific tasks,
typically for a limited period time, whereas in the managed economy labor contracts tended to be
general for an indefinite time period. The new legal forms of employment contracts and practices,
such as part-time workers, flex-workers, temporary workers, free lance workers, contract workers,
consultants, represent the injection of entrepreneurial forces in the labor market (Addison and
Welfens, 1998 and Eberts and Stone, 1992). For example, Paque (1998) shows that the share of
total employment accounted for by part-time workers has increased between 1973 and 1994 from
3.8 percent to 12.8 percent in Belgium, from 4.9 percent to 14.9 percent in France, from 10.1
percent to 15.1 percent in Germany, from 16.0 percent to 23.8 percent in the United Kingdom, and
between 1983 and 1994 from 21.4 percent to 35.0 percent in the Netherlands. The greater degree of
uncertainty and turnover experienced by workers in the entrepreneurial economy mirrors the greater
turbulence experienced by firms. Replacing long-term fixed contracts with new flexible forms of
work contracts provides the essential vehicle propelling the transition from the managed to the
entrepreneurial economy.
2.5. Diversity versus Specialization
There has been a series of theoretical arguments suggesting that the degree of diversity
versus specialization may account for differences in rates of growth and technological change.
There are two dimensions to this debate -- the firm and the industry. More recently, it has been
extended to geographic units, such as nations and regions. On the one hand, specialization of
industry activities is associated with lower transactions costs and therefore greater (static)
efficiency. 7 On the other hand, a diversity of activities is argued to facilitate the exchange of new
ideas and therefore greater innovative activity and (dynamic) efficiency.
One view, which Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992) attribute to the Marshall-
Arrow-Romer externality, suggests that an increased specialization of a particular industry
facilitates knowledge spillovers across firms because all workers are engaged in identical activity.
This model formalizes the insight that the concentration of an industry within a certain set of narrow
economic activities promotes knowledge spillovers between firms and therefore facilitates
innovative activity. An important assumption of the model is that knowledge externalities with
respect to firms exist, but only for firms within the same activities.
By contrast, restricting knowledge externalities to occur only within the specialized industry
may ignore an important source of new economic knowledge -- inter-industry knowledge spillovers.
Jacobs (1969) argues that the most important source of knowledge spillovers are external to the
industry in which the firm operates and that cities are the source of considerable innovation because
the diversity of knowledge sources in cities are the greatest. This same view about the role of
knowledge spillovers in cities is the basis of Lucas (1993). According to Jacobs, it is the exchange
of complementary knowledge across diverse firms and economic agents, which yields a greater
return on new economic knowledge. She develops a theory that emphasizes that the variety of
industries within a geographic region promotes knowledge externalities and ultimately innovative
activity and economic growth. 8
                                                                
7 This decrease in transactions costs results in a decrease in production costs.
8 The first important test of the specialisation versus diversity theories to date has focused not on the gains in terms of
innovative activity, but rather in terms of employment growth. Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992) employ
a data set on the growth of large industries in 170 cities between 1956 and 1987 in order to identify the relative
importance of the degree of regional specialisation, diversity and local competition play in influencing industry growth
rates. The authors find evidence that contradicts the Marshall-Arrow-Romer model but is consistent with the theories of
Jacobs. However, their study provided no direct evidence as to whether diversity is more important than specialisation
in generating innovation.
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Recent studies have provided evidence testing for the impact of diversity versus
specialization on the performance of regions, measured in terms of growth (Glaeser, Kallal,
Scheinkman and Shleifer, 1992) and in terms of innovative activity (Feldman and Audretsch, 1999).
These studies provide systematic empirical support for the thesis that diversity is more conducive to
knowledge spillovers and ultimately innovative activity and subsequent growth than is
specialization. 9
Because spillovers are an important source of knowledge generating innovative activity,
diversity is a prerequisite of the entrepreneurial economy. Sacrificing lower transactions costs for
greater opportunities for knowledge spillovers is preferable. In the managed economy, there is less
to be gained from the spillover of knowledge. The higher transactions costs associated with
diversity yield little in terms of increased innovative activity, making specialization preferable in
the managed economy.
2.6. Heterogeneity versus Homogeneity
A trade-off exists between the degree of heterogeneity and homogeneity within the
population. In contrast to the trade-off between diversity and specialization, which focuses on firms,
the trade-off involving population refers to individuals, which are the basis for decision-making
within firms and as consumers. There are two dimensions shaping the degree of
homogeneity/heterogeneity. The first refers to the genetic make-up of individuals and their personal
experiences (Nooteboom, 1994). The second dimension refers to the information set to which they
are exposed. The managed economy is based on homogeneity; the entrepreneurial economy on
heterogeneity. According to Nooteboom (1994, p. 330), “The sources that produce diversity within
the scope allowed for it, lie in the variance of backgrounds, motives and goals of entrepreneurship.”
To the extent that individuals in the population are identical, the costs of communication and
transactions are minimized (Olson, 1982). Lower costs of transaction in communication result in
(static) efficiency gains and facilitate a higher probability of knowledge spilling over across
individuals within the population. However, new ideas are less likely to emerge from
communication across individuals in a perfectly homogeneous population because these individuals
tend to be identical. This means that individuals in homogeneous populations tend to have access to
the same information sets and to evaluate any information set in a similar fashion. Thus, a
homogeneous population results in a higher probability of communications but those
communications have a lower impact because there are fewer new ideas to spill over. A world of
homogeneous economic agents promotes diffusion but not innovation.
In a heterogeneous population each individual has a unique genetic and experience profile,
and has access to a unique information set (Olson, 1982). The unique genetic and experience
profiles would result in a different evaluation across individuals even for a given set of information.
However, a heterogeneous population is also characterized by differential access to information.
This means that the costs of communications across individuals in a heterogeneous population tend
to be difficult and costly, resulting in higher transaction costs and lower levels of efficiency than in
a homogeneous population. At that same time, new ideas are more likely to emerge from
communication in a heterogeneous than in a homogeneous world. An implication is that the
likelihood of communication in a heterogeneous population is lower but such communication is
more prone to produce novelty and innovation. It is differences not similarities that generate
knowledge spillover. As Cohen and Malerba (1995) argue, the “tendency to variation is a chief
cause of progress.”
                                                                
9 Feldman and Audretsch (1999) provide systematic evidence that the gains from diversity hold for both the spatial and
firm units of observation.
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The trade-off between diversity versus specialization focuses on the population of firms and
industries. The trade-off discussed in this section is analogous and involves the population of
people. The lower transactions costs resulting from a homogeneous population in the managed
economy are not associated with a high opportunity cost, because knowledge spillovers are
relatively unimportant in generating innovative activity. However, knowledge spillovers are a
driving force in the entrepreneurial economy, which more than offset the higher transactions costs
associated with a heterogeneous population. The relative degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity
can be influenced by policies, such as those promoting immigration, mobility and education. 10
2.7. Motivation versus Control
If the application of British inventions in the 1800s had served as the catalyst for U.S.
industrialization, the revolution in management techniques -- the modern corporate structure --
enabled its implementation. According to Reich (1983, p. 26), "Managerialism offered America a
set of organizing principles at precisely the time when many Americans sensed a need for greater
organization and these principles soon shaped every dominant American institution precisely as
they helped those institutions become dominant. The logic of routine, large-scale manufacturing,
first shaped its original business environment and then permeated the larger social environment."
Through the structure of the modern corporation, the new managerialism excelled at
amassing large quantities of raw materials, labor and capital inputs, and at applying particular
manufacturing processes, thereby achieving a very specific use of these resources. The essence of
the managerialism was command and control of labor effort. Labor was considered to be
indistinguishable from all other inputs, as long as scientific management was able to extract a full
day's worth of energy for a full day's pay (Wheelwright, 1985). As tasks became increasingly
specialized, the skill level required of workers under the mass-production regime became less
important. What mattered most under Taylorism was the consistency and reliability of each precise
cog; what mattered least was the decision-making capability of each unit. Thus, the labor input in
the production process was reduced to routine (Chandler, 1990).
However, as the comparative advantage of the advanced industrialized countries in Europe
and North America become increasingly based on new knowledge, the command and control
approach to labor becomes less effective. What matters less is requiring an established set of
activities from knowledge workers and what matters more is motivating the workers to facilitate the
discovery and implementation of new ideas. The type of work environment fostering creativity
apparently is radically different from one simply harnessing the brute labor input of workers. A
central feature of work is dealing with uncertainty. As uncertainty replaces predictability as the
main characteristic of the work environment, workers who can deal with uncertain situations are
more valuable in the entrepreneurial economy. This contrast between the new entrepreneurial and
managed economies is reflected by the explosion of titles such as Managing Chaos, Re-
engineering, Management without Hierarchy, and De-Layering in the popular management
literature. Thus, in the entrepreneurial economy motivating employees to participate in the creation
and commercialization of new ideas matters more than in simply controlling and regulating their
behavior.
2.8. Market Exchange versus Firm Transaction
Dating back at least to Coase (1937) and more recently advanced by Williamson (1975), an
analytical distinction was made between exchange via the market and intra-firm transactions. Coase
(1937) and later Williamson (1975) argued that the size of an enterprise will be determined by
                                                                
10 It may be that the appropriate role of education was to foster homogeneity in the managed economy, but
heterogeneity in the entrepreneurial economy (Audretsch, Lederer, Thurik, Verheul and Wennekers, forthcoming).
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answering what Coase (1937, p. 30) articulated as, “The question always is, will it pay to bring an
extra exchange transaction under the organizing authority?” Both Coase (1937) and Williamson
(1975) emphasize that uncertainty and imperfect information increase the costs of intra-firm
transactions. As Knight (1921) argued, low uncertainty combined with transparency and
predictability of information, make intra-firm transactions efficient relative to market exchange.
However, in an era where uncertainty is high and information is imperfect, market exchange tends
to be more efficient than intra-firm transactions. In the managed economy, which was dominated by
a high degree of certainty and predictability of information, transactions within firms tended to be
more efficient than market exchange. This is consistent with the well-documented increase in both
vertical integration and conglomeration during the post-war period (Chandler, 1977). In the
entrepreneurial economy, both of these trends have been reversed (Carlsson, 1989). As Carlsson
and Taymaz (1994) show, there has been a decrease in both mean firm size as well as the extent of
vertical integration and conglomeration since the mid-1970s.
Coase was awarded a Nobel Prize for explaining why a firm should exist. But why should
more than one firm exist in an industry?11 One answer is provided by the traditional economics
literature focusing on industrial organization in the managed economy. An excess level of
profitability induces entry into the industry. And this is why the entry of new firms is interesting
and important in the managed economy -- because the new firms provide an equilibrating function
in the market, in that the levels of price and profit are restored to the competitive levels. In the
traditional theory, outputs and inputs in an industry are assumed to be homogenous. That is, the
entry of new firms in the managed economy is about business as usual -- it is just that with the new
entrant there is more of it. Geroski (1991a, p. 65) reflects the role of entry in the managed economy
by asserting, "If we think of entry as an error-correction mechanism which is attracted by and serves
to bid away excess profits, it is natural to suppose that entry will occur whenever profits differ from
their long-run levels. Given this maintained hypothesis, observations of actual entry rates and
current (or expected post-entry) profits can be used to make inferences about the unobservable of
interest -- long-run profits. In particular, entry in an industry is hypothesized to occur whenever
expected post-entry profits exceed the level of profits protected in the long run."
Empirical evidence in support of the model of entry in the managed economy is ambiguous
at best. This leads Geroski (1991b, p. 282) to conclude, "Right from the start, scholars have had
some trouble in reconciling the stories told about entry in standard textbooks with the substance of
what they have found in their data. Very few have emerged from their work feeling that they have
answered half as many questions as they have raises, much less that they have answered most of the
interesting ones."Perhaps one reason for this trouble is the inherently static model used to capture
an inherently dynamic process.12
In the entrepreneurial economy, the balance between market exchange and firm transactions
leads to a different role for the entry of new firms. This is because the entrepreneurial economy is
                                                                
11 Coase (1937, p. 23) himself asked, "A pertinent question to ask would appear to be (quite apart from the monopoly
considerations raised by Professor Knight), why, if by organising one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the
cost of production, are there any market transactions at all? Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?"
12 Manfred Neumann (1993, pp. 593-594) has criticised this traditional model of entry, as found in the individual
country studies contained in Geroski and Schwalbach (1991), because they "are predicated on the adoption of a
basically static framework. It is assumed that start-ups enter a given market where they are facing incumbents which
naturally try to fend off entry. Since the impact of entry on the performance of incumbents seems to be only slight, the
question arises whether the costs of entry are worthwhile, given the high rate of exit associated with entry. Geroski
appears to be rather sceptical about that. "I submit that adopting a static framework is misleading....In fact, generally, an
entrant can only hope to succeed if he employs either a new technology or offers a new product, or both. Just imitating
incumbents is almost certainly doomed to failure. If the process of entry is looked upon from this perspective the high
correlation between gross entry and exit reflects the inherent risks of innovating activities...Obviously it is rather
difficult to break loose from the inherited mode of reasoning within the static framework. It is not without merit, to be
sure, but it needs to be enlarged by putting it into a dynamic setting."
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based more on the factor of new knowledge and less on the traditional factors of land, labor and
capital upon which the managed economy thrived. There is an inherent difference between new
knowledge and the traditional factors. As Knight (1921), and later Arrow (1962) emphasized, new
economic knowledge is anything but certain. Not only is new economic knowledge inherently risky,
but also substantial asymmetries exist across agents both between and within firms (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1987). The expected value of a new idea, or potential innovation, is likely to be anything
but unanimous between the inventor of that idea and the decision maker, or group of decision
makers, of the firm confronted with evaluating proposed changes or innovations.13
Combined with the bureaucratic organization of incumbent firms to make a decision, the
asymmetry of knowledge leads to a host of agency problems, spanning incentive structures,
monitoring, and transaction costs. It is the existence of such agency costs, combined with
asymmetric information that not only provides an incentive for agents with new ideas to appropriate
the expected value of their knowledge externally by starting new firms, but also with a propensity
that varies systematically from industry to industry. 14
To minimize agency problems and the cost of monitoring, bureaucratic hierarchies develop
objective rules.15 As Holmstrom (1989, p. 323) points out, "Monitoring limitations suggest that the
firm seeks out activities which are more easily and objectively evaluated. Assignments will be
chosen in a fashion that is conducive to more effective control. Authority and command systems
work better in environments, which are more predictable and can be directed with less investment
information. Routine tasks are the comparative advantage of a bureaucracy and its activities can be
expected to reflect that."
Williamson (1975, p. 201) has also emphasized the inherent tension between hierarchical
bureaucratic organizations and the ability of incumbent organizations to appropriate the value of
new knowledge for innovative activity outside of the technological trajectories associated with the
core competence of that organization, "Were it that large firms could compensate internal
entrepreneurial activity in ways approximating that of the market, the large firm need experience no
disadvantage in entrepreneurial respects. Violating the congruency between hierarchical position
and compensation appears to generate bureaucratic strains, however, and is greatly complicated by
the problem of accurately imputing causality." This leads Williamson (1975, pp. 205-206) to
conclude that, "I am inclined to regard the early stage innovative disabilities of large size as serious
                                                                
13 It is because information is not only imperfect but also asymmetric that Knight (1921, p. 268) argued that the primary
task of the firm is to process information in order to reach a decision: "With the introduction of uncertainty -- the fact of
ignorance and the necessity of acting upon opinion rather than knowledge -- into this Eden-like situation (that is a world
of perfect information), its character is entirely changed...With uncertainty present doing things, the actual execution of
activity, becomes in a real sense a secondary part of life; the primary problem or function is deciding what to do and
how to do it."
14 Alchian (1950) pointed out that the existence of knowledge asymmetries would result in the inevitability of mistaken
decisions in an uncertain world. Later, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) attributed the existence of asymmetric information
across the employees in a firm as resulting in a problem of monitoring the contribution accruing from each employee
and setting the rewards correspondingly. This led them to conclude that, "The problem of economic organisation is the
economical means of metering productivity and rewards" (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p. 783). Coase (1937) and later
Williamson (1975) argued that the size of an (incumbent) enterprise will be determined by answering what Coase
(1937, p. 30) articulated as, "The question always is, will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the
organising authority?" In fact, Coase (1937, p. 24) pointed out that, "Other things being equal, a firm will tend to be
larger the less likely the (firm) is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the
transactions organised."
15 Holmstrom (1989) and Milgrom (1988) have pointed out the existence of what they term as a bureaucratisation
dilemma , where, "To say that increased size brings increased profit is a safe generalisation. To note that bureaucracy is
viewed as an organisational disease is equally accurate" (Holmstrom, 1989, p. 320). In addition, Kreps (1991) has
argued that such bureaucratic rules promote internal uniformity and that a uniform corporate culture, in turn, promotes
the reputation of the firm. These bureaucratic rules, however, make it more difficult to evaluate the efforts and activities
of agents involved in activities that do not conform to such bureaucratic rules.
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and propose the following hypothesis: An efficient procedure by which to introduce new products is
for the initial development and market testing to be performed by independent investors and small
firms (perhaps new entrants) in an industry, the successful developments then to be acquired,
possibly through licensing or merger, for subsequent marketing by a large multidivision enterprise.
Put differently, a division of effort between the new product innovation process on the one hand,
and the management of proven resources on the other may well be efficient."
The degree to which agents and incumbent firms are confronted with knowledge
asymmetries and agency problems with respect to seeking out new economic knowledge and
(potential) innovative activity would not be expected to be constant across industries. This is
because the underlying knowledge conditions vary from industry to industry. In some industries
new economic knowledge generating innovative activity tends to be relatively routine and can be
processed within the context of incumbent hierarchical bureaucracies. In other industries, however,
innovations tend to come from knowledge that is not of a routine nature and therefore tends to be
rejected by the hierarchical bureaucracies of incumbent corporations. Nelson and Winter (1982)
describe these different underlying knowledge conditions as reflecting two distinct technological
regimes -- the entrepreneurial and routinized technological regimes: "An entrepreneurial regime is
one that is favorable to innovative entry and unfavorable to innovative activity by established firms;
a routinized regime is one in which the conditions are the other way around." (Winter, 1984, p.
297). As the comparative advantage of the advanced industrial economies shifts towards innovative
industries, what is true for those industries holds for entire countries.16
In the managed economy, there is likely to be relatively little divergence in the evaluation of
the expected value of a (potential) innovation between the inventor and the decision making
bureaucracy of the firm.  A great incentive for agents to start their own firms will not exist. In the
entrepreneurial economy, however, a divergence in beliefs between the agent and the principal
regarding the expected value of a (potential) innovation is more likely to emerge.17 It is in the
entrepreneurial economy where the start-up of new firms is likely to play a more important role,
presumably as a result of the motivation to appropriate the value of economic knowledge.
2.9. Competition and Co-operation as Complements versus Competition
and Co-operation as Substitutes
While models of competition generally assume that firms behave autonomously, models of
cooperation involve linkages among firms. These linkages take various forms, including joint
ventures, strategic alliances, and formal and informal networks (Gomes-Casseres, 1996 and 1997).
In the managed economy competition and co-operation are viewed as being substitutes. This is
because firms are vertically integrated and compete primarily in product markets. Co-operation
between firms in the product market reduces the number of competitors and lessens the degree of
                                                                
16 Gort and Klepper (1982) argued that the relative innovative advantage between newly established enterprises and
incumbent firms depends upon the source of information generating innovative activity. If information based on non-
transferrable experience in the market is an important input in generating innovative activity, then incumbent firms will
tend to have the innovative advantage over new firms. This is consistent with Winter's (1984) notion of the routinized
regime, where the accumulated stock of non-transferrable information is the product of experience within the market,
which firms outside of the main incumbent organisations, by definition, cannot possess. By contrast, when information
outside of the routines practised by the incumbent firms is a relatively important input in generating innovative activity,
newly established firms will tend to have the innovative advantage over incumbent firms. Arrow (1962), Mueller
(1976), and Williamson (1975) have all emphasised that when such information created outside of the incumbent firms
cannot be easily transferred to those incumbent enterprises -- presumably due to the type of agency and bureaucracy
problems described above -- the holder of such knowledge must enter the industry by starting a new firm in order to
exploit the expected value of his knowledge.
17 In the framework of Hirschman (1970), if an agent in possession of potentially valuable economic knowledge is
unable to exercise voice within an existing firm, only loyalty will prevent him from exercising exit by starting a new
firm.
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competition. In the entrepreneurial economy firms are vertically independent and specialized in the
product market. The greater degree of vertical disintegration in the entrepreneurial economy means
that co-operation among independent firms replaces internal transactions within a large vertically
integrated corporation. At the same time, there are more firms, resulting in an increase in both the
competitive as well as the co-operative interface. The likelihood that a firm may end up competing
or co-operating with another firm is greater in the entrepreneurial economy. In addition, new and
enhanced configurations bring independent firms together in new and unexpected ways.
As Zvi Griliches (1992) has pointed out, knowledge spillovers come from different people
working on similar things. A rich set of empirical evidence supports Griliches’ conjecture in
identifying that knowledge spillovers are promoted in clusters of economic activity (Audretsch and
Feldman, 1996 and Audretsch and Stephan, 1996). Thus, co-operation between individuals as well
as between different firms generates the spillover of knowledge and new ideas. There is a large
incentive for individuals and firms to interact co-operatively to create and explore new ideas that
would otherwise remain undiscovered.
At the same time, there is a high degree of competition among firms for new ideas.
Knowledge embodied in individuals and teams of individuals, which is not used by one firm will be
pursued by another firm if it is perceived as valuable. Thus, there is a high degree of competition for
new ideas by the very firms that are co-operating to create those ideas. In addition, the increased
interaction of firms and individuals facilitates the rapid diffusion of new ideas and the outcome of
efforts to generate new ideas across individuals in different firms as well as within firms. In the
managed economy, the monopolization of information was typically associated with power:
“Information is power” and is to be shared sparingly seemed to be the practice within large
organizations.
In studying the networks in California's Silicon Valley, Saxenian (1990, pp. 96-97)
emphasizes that it is the co-operation between individuals which facilitates the transmission of
knowledge across agents, firms, and even industries, and not just a high endowment of human
capital and knowledge in the region: "It is not simply the concentration of skilled labor, suppliers
and information that distinguish the region. A variety of regional institutions -- including Stanford
University, several trade associations and local business organizations, and a myriad of specialized
consulting, market research, public relations and venture capital firms -- provide technical,
financial, and networking services which the region's enterprises often cannot afford individually.
These networks defy sectoral barriers: individuals move easily from semiconductor to disk drive
firms or from computer to network makers. They move from established firms to start-ups (or vice
versa) and even to market research or consulting firms, and from consulting firms back into start-
ups. And they continue to meet at trade shows, industry conferences, and the scores of seminars,
talks and social activities organized by local business organizations and trade associations. In these
forums, relationships are easily formed and maintained, technical and market information is
exchanged, business contacts are established, and new enterprises are conceived...This
decentralized and fluid environment also promotes the diffusion of intangible technological
capabilities and understandings."18
There is at least some empirical evidence suggesting that cooperative activity has been
increasing over time. As Figure 4 shows, the number of formal technology agreements has
increased in the United States.
                                                                
18 Saxenian (1990, pp. 97-98) claims that even the language and vocabulary used by technical specialists is specific to a
region,"...a distinct language has evolved in the region and certain technical terms used by semiconductor production
engineers in Silicon Valley would not even be understood by their counterparts in Boston's Route 128."
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Figure 4
Source: National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996  (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1996), p. 158, taken from http://www.neweconomyindex.org/index.html
Thus, in the managed economy increasing the amount of co-operation reduces the degree of
competition. There are simply fewer rivals competing in the product market. In the entrepreneurial
economy, both competition and co-operation exist simultaneously. An increase in competition may
actually generate an increase in co-operation in the search for knowledge spillovers.
2.10. Flexibility versus Scale
The classic manner for reducing cost-per-unit in economics under the managed economy
was through expanding the scale of output, or through exploiting economies of scale. In product
lines and industries where a large scale of production renders a substantial reduction in average
cost, large firms will have an economic advantage, leading to a concentrated industrial structure.
The importance of scale economies no doubt contributed to the emergence and dominance of large
corporations in heavy manufacturing industries such as steel, automobiles, and aluminum
(Chandler, 1977).
The alternative source of reduced average costs under the entrepreneurial economy is
through flexibility. As Teece (1993, p. 218) argues, “Flexible specialization … and contracting may
today yield greater advantages than economies of scale and scope generated internally.” Industries
where demand for particular products is constantly shifting require a flexible system of production
that can meet such a shifting demand. There are four major sources of flexibility – technological,
organizational, demand side and qualitative. These four sources of flexibility result in a decrease in
the importance of scale economies.
Technological flexibility refers to the emergence of certain new technologies, such as
computer numerically controlled machine tools facilitating flexible production. Systematic attempts
to estimate the impact of these new technologies on the extent of scale economies (Carlsson, 1989
and Carlsson and Taymaz, 1994) have resulted in the conclusion that the importance of scale
economies has been drastically reduced in industries where such flexible technology has been
implemented.
The second manifestation of flexibility is in terms of the organization of production. While
the organization of production was centered upon mass-production during the first three decades of
this century, an alternative system of industrial organization, flexible specialization has seen
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something of a re-emergence during the last several decades of this century (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
Flexible production consists of producing smaller series of specially designed goods of a specific
quality for a niche market. Such goods typically command a higher price and cannot be so easily
diffused to lower-cost production locations. The organization of industry centered around flexible
specialization typically contains five key elements:
A reliance upon multi-purpose equipment. General purpose equipment enhances the
flexibility to rapidly change the product specifications to meet specific demands of customers. This
requires high levels of human capital and skilled labor.
Continual innovative activity. Both the nature of the product(s) as well as production and
organization methods are continually improved upon.
Clustering. Groupings of enterprises, in both a product as well as a geographic dimension
provide a seedbed for the exchange of new ideas. Not only does physical proximity tend to facilitate
the transmission of knowledge, but it also enhances the development of institutions and makes them
more effective.
Networking. Formal and informal links between enterprises, including subcontracting
relationships facilitate both increased economic specialization external to the firm as well as
superior access to information.
Spillover Effects. Knowledge created within an enterprise spills over for use by other
enterprises. Conversely, enterprises and individuals have access to external knowledge.
There is considerable evidence supporting the hypothesis that not only does flexible
production provide a viable alternative to mass production as a system of industrial organization,
but also that such systems centered around flexible production actually outperform those based on
mass production. This evidence spans both developed and less developed countries (Piore and
Sabel, 1984).19
The third type of flexibility refers to the ability of production to absorb demand fluctuations
(Mills, 1984). There is a trade-off between efficiency, as measured by the costs of producing a
given level of output, on the one hand, and flexibility, as measured by the costs of adjusting output,
on the other hand. Large firms with high capital investment achieve a larger scale of output at a
lower marginal cost than do small labor intensive enterprises. But the labor intensity of small firms
enables them to adjust their current level of output at lower cost than their larger counterparts,
which are capital and not labor intensive. As Brock and Evans (1989, p. 10) summarize, “Smaller
firms incur higher marginal production costs at a point in time than larger firms but include lower
marginal adjust costs over time as demand fluctuates.”
The fourth type of flexibility refers to the ability for economic activity to respond to
qualitative changes in market demands. In a world of wealth and affluence, consumer demand is
heterogeneous and fickle. Demand tends to proliferate across a broad spectrum of product class
niches. The variances in consumer demand across product types and over time creates a
continuously changing set of product niches. Knowledge about these niches is uncertain for two
reasons. First, the niches are difficult to observe and are changing. Second, the set of economic
agents evaluating potential opportunities is heterogeneous. These two knowledge conditions are
                                                                
19 One of the most striking examples of superior economic performance emerging from the industrial organisation
model of flexible production is provided by Emilia Romagna, a mixed agricultural-industrial region located in North
Central Italy with a population of around four million, and usually referred to as The Third Italy. Through flexible
production small firms have achieved a better economic performance than large enterprises by creating specialised
industrialised districts where an agglomeration of producers in one industry work in close physical proximity. In what
has become known as the Emilian Model of Production , the narrow division of labour common to large enterprises has
been replaced by an organisational structure where employees perform a wide variety of different tasks (Piore and
Sabel, 1984).
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pivotal for understanding the entrepreneurial economy. This means that people are confronted with
a variance in evaluations about the relevance of opportunities of the prospective ventures and,
hence, the relevance of possible actions. Individuals who seek to appropriate the value of such
knowledge by starting a new firm serve as agents of change by injecting flexibility into the
economy. A common myth prevalent in the popular press is that small firms are more flexible than
large firms. This belief suffers from a fallacy of composition. The mistake is committed at the unit
of observation – the firm. Rather, the empirical evidence suggests that a population of firms, or an
organization of industry consisting of diverse new and small firms provides greater flexibility than
does an organization of industry consisting of large corporations. Systematic empirical evidence is
provided by Audretsch (1995) that the development and evolution of new industries is promoted by
the presence of a large number of small firms, and by Audretsch and Thurik (2000) that national
unemployment rates are lower in countries with a greater number of firms.
Scale economies were the engine that drove efficiency and growth in the managed economy.
In the entrepreneurial economy the multiple dimensions of flexibility replace scale economies as the
organizing principle for economic activity.
2.11. Stimulation versus Regulation
The public policies emerging in the post-war period of the managed economy dealing with
the firm in the market were essentially constraining in nature. There were three general types of
public policies towards business -- antitrust (competition policy), regulation, and public ownership.
All three of these policy approaches restricted the firm's freedom to contract. While specific policy
approaches tended to be more associated with one country than with others, such as antitrust in the
United States, or public ownership in France and Sweden, all countries shared a common policy
approach of intervening to restrain what otherwise was perceived as too much market power held
by firms.
Public policies constraining the freedom of the firm were certainly consistent with the
Weltanschauung emerging from the theories and empirical evidence. Left unchecked, the large
corporation in possession of market power would allocate resources in such a way as to reduce
economic welfare. Through state intervention the trade-off between efficiency on the hand and
fairness on the other would be solved in a manner that presumably would be more socially
satisfying. Galbraith (1956) is the seminal statement on the role of government in the managed
economy, where state intervention typically involved the social partnership of big business, big
government and big labor. This social partnership existed in nearly every Western economy.
In the entrepreneurial economy the relevant policy question has shifted away from How can
the government constrain firms from abusing their market power? to How can governments create
an environment fostering the success and viability of firms?20 The major issues in the entrepreneurial
economy have shifted away from concerns about excess profits and abuses of market dominance to
international competitiveness, growth and employment. The concern about corporations is not that
they are too successful and too powerful but that they are not successful enough. Jorde and Teece
(1991) argued for the emasculation of the antitrust laws in order to enable American firms to co-
operate and compete more effectively against their Japanese and European competitors.
As the waves of small start-ups in newly emerging high-technology industries demonstrate,
the link between success and market power has been broken. The government policies of the
entrepreneurial economy have increasingly shifted away from regulation to stimulation. Examples
include the promotion joint R&D programs, fostering efforts to innovate and the creation of new
firms.
                                                                
20 The Microsoft case suggests that the concern about market dominance is in terms of suppression of future innovative
activity rather than profit levels.
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2.12. Targeting Inputs versus Targeting Outputs
Stimulation and regulation are not the only dimensions regarding the role of government
policy in the managed and entrepreneurial economies. A second dimension involves targeting
selected outputs or outcomes in the production process versus targeting selected inputs. Because of
the relative certainty regarding markets and products in the managed economy, the appropriate
policy response is to target outcomes and outputs. Specific industries along with particular firms
could be promoted through government programs. The targeting of specific firms in selected
industries was clearly a successful policy for Japan in the post-war period and helped the Japanese
achieve the competitive advantage in industries such as automobiles and electronics. As Joseph E.
Stiglitz (1996) concludes from “Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle,” “government
interventions acting together” (p. 151) account for at least part of the post-war Japanese growth
miracle. The success of Japanese industrial policy in promoting a broad range of performance
criteria, spanning the trade performance to economic growth has been painstakingly documented in
a number of systematic empirical studies (Pugel, 1984; Audretsch, 1989; Audretsch and Yamawaki,
1988; Noland, 1993 and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1991).
Targeting outputs has had a long tradition in Europe. As a response to “The American
Challenge,” in the form of the dynamism, organization, innovation, and boldness that characterize
the giant American corporations,” Servan Schreiber (1968, p. 153) prescribed an R&D policy that
would undertake “the creation of large industrial units which are able both in size and management
to compete with the American giants”. Because giant corporations were thought to be needed to
amass the requisite R&D resources for innovation, Servan-Schreiber (1968, p. 159) argued that
“The first problem of an industrial policy for Europe consists in choosing 50 to 100 firms which,
once they are large enough, would be the most likely to become world leaders of modern
technology in their fields. At the moment we are simply letting industry be gradually destroyed by
the superior power of American corporations.” This R&D policy prescription of targeting outputs is
echoed in the 1988 Cecchini Report to the Commission of the European Union, where the
anticipated gains from European integration are measured in terms of reduced costs achieved
through increases in scale economies when firms are no longer limited to domestic markets and can
instead operate on a larger European market.
How relevant are targeting outputs and outcomes today? One has to wonder what would
have happened to the United States computer semiconductor industry had IBM been selected as “a
national interest” around 1980 and promoted through favorable treatment as well as protected from
threats like Apple Computer, Microsoft, and Intel. Would the United States be as strong in the
computer, semiconductor, and software industries as it is today? While the proclamation, “What is
good for General Motors is good for America” may have been sensible in the managed economy, it
no longer holds in the entrepreneurial economy.
The entrepreneurial economy is based less on the traditional inputs of land, labor and
capital, and more on the input of knowledge. It is no longer certain what products should be
produced, how they should be produced, and by whom. There are many indicators reflecting the
shift towards greater uncertainty associated with knowledge-based economic activity. For example,
Kortum and Lerner (1997, p. 1) point to “the unprecedented recent jump in patenting in the United
States,” as evidenced by the rise in applications for the U.S. patents by American inventors since
1985, which exceeds the increase in any other decade in this century. Throughout this century,
patent applications fluctuated within a band of between 40,000-80,000 per year. By contrast, in
1995 there were over 120,000 patent applications. Similarly, Berman, Bound and Machin (1997)
have shown that the demand for less skilled workers has decreased dramatically throughout the
OECD, while at the same time the demand for skilled workers capable of dealing with uncertainty
has exploded.
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This increased degree of uncertainty increases the difficulty of selecting the correct
outcomes and increases the likelihood that the wrong firm and industry will be targeted. Rather, the
appropriate policy in what Paul Krugman (1994) terms as The Age of Uncertainty is to target inputs,
and in particular those inputs involved in the creation and commercialization of knowledge. Such
policies involve basic and applied research at universities and research institutes, investments in the
general level of education as well as advanced technical specialties, and the training and upgrading
of the skill levels of workers.21 While outcomes and outputs in the form of specific industries and
even firms are targeted in the managed economy, the entrepreneurial economy calls for policy that
creates an environment, or Rahmenbedingungen, facilitating the creation and commercialization of
knowledge.
2.13. Local Policy versus National Policy
The rationale and target of policy – stimulation versus control and inputs versus outputs --
are not the only aspects to differ between the managed and entrepreneurial economies. A third
dimension involves the locus of policy. Under the managed economy, the appropriate locus of
policy making is at the national or federal level. While the targeted recipients of policy may be
localized in one or a few regions, the most important policy making institutions tend to be at the
national level. By contrast, under the entrepreneurial economy, the locus of government policy
towards business tends to be decentralized and regional in nature.
In the managed economy, a federal or national locus of control of large, oligopolistic firms
in command of considerable market power is appropriate. This is because the benefits and costs
derived from that market power are asymmetric between the local region where the firm is located
and the national market, where the firm sells its product. Not only is production concentrated in one
or just several regions, but the workers along with ancillary suppliers also tend to be located in the
same regions. These workers as well as the community at large, share the fruits accruing from
monopoly power. Systematic empirical evidence (Weiss, 1966) shows that wages are positively
related to the degree of market power held by a firm, even after controlling for unionization. Higher
profits resulting from market power are shared by labor. Workers and firms in their region have the
same interest.
As Olson (1982) shows, relatively small coalitions of economic agents benefiting from some
collective action tend to prevail over a large group of dispersed economic agents each incurring a
small cost from that action. The costs of organizing and influencing policy are relatively low for the
small coalition enjoying the benefits but large for the group of dispersed economic agents.
Government policies to control large oligopolistic firms with substantial market power are not as
likely to be successful if they are implemented on the local level. Rather, as Olson (1982) predicts, a
regional locus of policy towards business in the managed economy tends to result in the capture of
policy by the coalition of local interests benefiting from that policy. Only by shifting the locus of
policy away from the region to the national level can the capture of policy by special interest groups
be minimized. This is because the negative effects of market power in the form of higher prices are
spread throughout the national market while the benefits accruing from that power are locally
concentrated.
The most important institutions administering antitrust policy and regulation, which were
given the mandate by the United States Congress to constrain the market power of big business
during the era of the managed economy, were at the national level. Beginning with the Sherman Act
of 1890 and the Interstate Commerce Act of 1890, which established the first federal regulatory
agency, the mandate for the control of large oligopolistic enterprises with substantial market power
                                                                
21 For example, the Hope Scholarship in the state of Georgia enables all students to attend the state universities for free
as long as they maintain a B average.
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was mainly at the level of the federal government (Audretsch, 1989). The Antitrust Division of the
United States Justice Department combined with the Federal Trade Commission to safeguard
America against the abuse of market power, while a broad range of federal regulatory agencies,
starting with the Interstate Commerce Commission and later the Federal Communications
Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Boards were created to regulate large, oligopolistic firms in
concentrated markets. But starting in the Carter Administration of the late 1970s and continuing
into the Administrations of Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton, antitrust has been de-emphasized
and a twenty year wave of deregulation has led to a downsizing and even closure of a number of the
former regulatory agencies.
Many economists interpret the downsizing of the federal agencies charged with the
regulation of business as the eclipse of government intervention. But to interpret the retreat of the
federal government as the end of government intervention is to confuse the downsizing of
government with a reshifting of the locus of government policy away from the federal level to the
local level. The last two decades have seen the emergence of a set of policy initiatives at the local
level. The new industrial policy of the entrepreneurial economy is decentralized and regional in
nature. As Sternberg (1996) emphasizes in his review of successful technology policy in the four
leading technological countries, the most important industrial policies in the last decades have been
local not national. They have occurred in locations such as Research Triangle (Link, 1995), Austin
Texas, and Cambridge (UK). Sternberg (1996) shows how the success of a number of different
high-technology clusters spanning the four most technologically advanced countries is the direct
result of regional policy.
Eisinger (1990) asks the question, "Do American States Do Industrial Policy?" Lowery and
Gray (1990) confirm Eisinger's affirmative answer by analyzing the impact of state industrial policy
in the United States. They develop a new data set on gross state product and a new measure of state
industrial policy activism. Their results suggest that the implementation of industrial policy at the
state level tends to promote growth. For example, Feller (1997, p. 289) points out that "In theory
and implementation, state technology development programs – as in Texas, Ohio, New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania – may be viewed as bands on a wide spectrum from basic research to
product development, with the ends reflecting quite different state strategies."
The Advanced Research Program in Texas has provided support for basic research and the
strengthening of the university infrastructure, which played a central role in developing the high-
tech cluster around Austin. The Thomas Edison Centers in Ohio22, the Advanced Technology
Centers in New Jersey, and the Centers for Advanced Technology at Case Western Reserve
University, Rutgers University, and the University of Rochester have supported generic pre-
competitive research. 23
This shift in the locus of policy is the result of two factors. First, because the competitive
source of economic activity in the entrepreneurial economy is knowledge, which tends to be
localized in regional clusters, public policy requires an understanding of regional-specific
characteristics and idiosyncrasies. As Sternberg (1996) concludes, regional strengths provide the
major source of innovative clusters.  The second factor is that the motivation underlying
government policy in the entrepreneurial economy is growth and the creation of (high-paying) jobs,
largely through the creation of new firms. These new firms are typically small and pose no
oligopolistic threat in national or international markets. There are no external costs imposed on
consumers in the national economy in the form of higher prices as is the case in the managed
economy. There is no reason that the promotion of local economies imposes a cost on consumers in
                                                                
22 See Carlsson and Braunerhjelm (1999) for an analysis about the role of the Edison Biotechnology Center in creating
biomedical clusters in Ohio.
23 It should be emphasized that clearly, not all local interventions are effective.
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the national economy, so that local intervention is justified and does not result in any particular loss
incurred by agents outside of the region.
2.14. Risk Capital versus Low-Risk Capital
In the managed economy, the systems of finance in Europe have provided the existing
companies with liquidity for investment.24 This is particularly true in countries such as Germany,
where the banks are allowed to hold equity positions in private companies (Cable, 1985). Many
scholars have argued that allowing bank ownership of private companies has given Germany a
superior mechanism linking finance to production (Edwards and Fischer, 1994 and Mayer and
Alexander, 1990). The evidence suggests this was true as long as Germany’s comparative
advantage was in traditional industries, such as automobile production, machine tools and
metalworking (Audretsch and Elston, 1997). But as the comparative advantage in the European
Union shifts away from managed industries towards entrepreneurial activities the demand for
finance also shifts away from financing investment in traditional industries towards high-risk
ventures. This means that, under the entrepreneurial economy, the traditional means of finance are
not longer appropriate. Of particular importance is venture capital, which has traditionally been a
form of finance for high-risk innovative new firms and the informal capital market (Gaston, 1989,
Gompers, 1999). As Figure 5 shows, venture capital has recently become more prevalent.
Figure 5
Source: The National Venture Capital Association 1997 Annual Report (Arlington, VA: NVCA, 1998), prepared by
Venture Economics (a division of Securities Data Company), taken from http://www.neweconomyindex.org/index.html
Informal risk capital is equity and near-equity invested by private individuals directly, that is
informally, without formal intermediation  (Mason and Harrison, 1997). Near equity investments
refer to loans or loan guarantees provided by individuals to firms where the individuals hold an
equity. This has been referred to in the finance literature as informal debt or informal risk capital.
Such informal risk capital is virtually the only source of risk or venture-type capital for most SMEs,
once their capital needs surpass family resources (Hughes, 1997). As Gaston points out, “Informal
capital markets are the leading sources of external source of external risk capital fuelling
entrepreneurial start-ups and small business growth”(Gaston, 1989, p. 223).
                                                                
24 For a very thorough analysis on finance, see Hughes and Storey (1994), Storey (1994), and the special issues of Small
Business Economics devoted to European SME Financing  (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997), and to Financing and Small
Firm Dynamics (Reid, 1996).
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Because the availability of venture capital and informal capital varies substantially across
countries, new ventures flourish where they have the easiest access to finance. For example, the
institution of venture capital is considerably more developed in the United States than in Europe.
And the manner in which that venture capital is used also varies between Europe and the United
States. The deficiency of venture capital and informal capital has impeded restructuring in the form
of a liquidity constraint to people seeking finance to start a new company in a new industry.
The entrepreneurial economy requires a system of finance different from that in the
managed economy. Since the managed economy was based on certainty in outputs as well as inputs,
a strong connection between banks and firms fostered growth. Certainty has given way to
uncertainty in the entrepreneurial economy, so that financial institutions must also change.
3. Conclusions
The continued rising unemployment coupled with stagnant growth in Europe has triggered a
plea by policy makers for rethinking the policy approach that ushered in European prosperity during
the post-war era. Those countries that have succeeded in creating new jobs and reducing
unemployment seem to have accomplished this at the cost of lower wages and deterioration of a
civil society. The resulting policy debate has been miscast as the European Model versus the
American Model. This debate is wrong because it confuses a fundamental shift in economic
systems with what used to be a recognized and widely accepted policy trade-off. The policy debate
should be instead cast as the entrepreneurial versus the managed economy.
The managed economy flourished for most of this century. It was based on relative certainty
in outputs, which consisted mainly of manufactured products, and in inputs, which consisted mainly
of land, labor and capital. The twin forces of globalization have reduced the ability of the managed
economies of Western Europe and North America to grow and create jobs. On the one hand has
come the advent of new competition from low-cost but relatively high educated and skill-intensive
countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia. On the other hand, the telecommunications
and computer revolutions have drastically reduced the cost of shifting not just capital but also
information out of the high-cost locations of Europe and into lower-cost locations around the globe.
Taken together, these twin forces of globalization mean that economic activity in a high-cost
location is no longer compatible with routinized tasks. Rather, globalization has shifted the
comparative advantage of high-cost locations to knowledge-based activities, and in particular search
activities, which cannot be costlessly transferred around the globe.
Knowledge as an input into economic activity is inherently different from land, labor and
capital. It is characterized by high uncertainty, high asymmetries across people and is costly to
transact. The response to an economy where knowledge is the main source of comparative
advantage is the entrepreneurial economy. This paper has identified fourteen characteristics that
differ between the entrepreneurial and managed economies and provides a framework for
understanding how the entrepreneurial economy fundamentally differs from the managed economy.
Such a framework provides a lens through which to interpret economic events and formulate policy.
Application of the wrong lens leads to the wrong policy choice. For example, under the managed
economy firm failure is viewed negatively and as representing a drain on society’s resources.
According to this view, resources should not be invested in higher risk ventures. When viewed
through the lens of the entrepreneurial economy, firm failure is interpreted differently. It is seen as
an experiment, an attempt to go in a new direction in an inherently risky environment. An
externality of failure is learning. In the entrepreneurial economy, failure accompanies the process of
searching for new ideas. It similarly follows that the positive virtues of long-term relationships,
stability, continuity under the managed economy give way to flexibility, change, and turbulence in
the entrepreneurial economy. What is a liability in the managed economy is, in some case, a virtue
in the entrepreneurial economy.
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The current policy debate has been erroneously miscast as more versus less government.
The wave of government downsizing, combined with deregulation, privatization, and the retreat of
antitrust has created an impression that there is no more role for the government to play other than
to get out of the way of private interests. What has been overlooked is the inherently different role
of government policy in the entrepreneurial than in the managed economy. The well-documented
high technology clusters of the world have not been created in a vacuum. The policies helping to
shape such innovative clusters are not only different in that they are local, rather than national, but
they also target inputs in the process of creating and commercializing knowledge, rather than
outputs, such as particular firms.
Government policy in the managed economy was largely about control. High certainty
dictated that it was known what to produce, how it should be produced, and who would produce it.
The role of government was to constrain the power of large corporations, which were needed for
efficiency under mass-production, but posed a threat to democracy through their concentration of
power. Under the managed economy the policy debate centered on competition policies (antitrust),
regulation and public ownership of business. In the entrepreneurial economy these constraining
policies have become increasingly irrelevant. The central role of government policy in the
entrepreneurial economy is enabling in nature. The focus is to foster the production and
commercialization of knowledge. Rather than focus on limiting the freedom of firms to contract
through antitrust, regulation and public ownership, government policy in the entrepreneurial
economy targets education, increasing the skills and human capital of workers, and facilitating the
mobility of workers and their ability to start new firms.
The economic failure of the Soviet Union and her Eastern European satellites was to a great
extent a failure to participate in the micro-electronic revolution. 25 Computerized technology implied
a shift away from a concentrated and rigid structure and toward a fluid, decentralized system as the
most efficient means of production, which constituted a direct threat to the political principle of
centralizing all information and decision making under communism. While the demise of
communism has been widely celebrated as a victory for western capitalism, what has been
overlooked is that the system of capitalism dominating most of this century – the managed economy
– is now itself under attack by the same forces that undermined communism.
The prevailing view about the gains to Europe through integration has been formulated in
terms of lower costs resulting from a greater exploitation of scale economies. The 1988 Cecchini
Report, building on the tradition of Servan Schreiber (1968), measured these gains to Europe in
terms of cost reduction. Through growth, mergers, combinations and rationalization, larger
European firms will generate gains to European consumers in the form of lower costs. Convergence
of institutions and nations in Europe is a goal, since this facilitates the single European markets and
large-scale production and sales. Focusing on scale economies resulting from a large market size is
a metric implicit in the managed economy. The analysis of this paper, focusing instead on the
entrepreneurial economy, predicts the major economic benefits of European Integration will come
not through economies of scale, but rather through economies of diversity. In an uncertain world,
the diversity of European cultures and institutions is well positioned to generate a diversity of
different approaches to economic problems. Diversity, not convergence, generates innovation and
growth.
                                                                
25Sylos-Labini (1992, p. 63) observed that, “In the last two or three decades, after a number of attempts that ailed at
decentralising many activities and of giving more discretionary power to managers, the difficulties rose very rapidly and
the Soviet economy entered a period of general crisis. Concentrating economic, organisational, and scientific efforts on
military production, the Soviet Union has succeeded, at least for a period, in not losing ground in this sector with
respect to the United States and other Western countries. But even this sector -- after the latest developments in
electronics, which, especially in the United States, owe much to the contribution of small firms -- has shown increasing
signs of weakness.” See also Richard R. Nelson (1992).
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A series of empirical studies has identified that a pervasive shift in the industrial structure
away from large corporations and towards small enterprises has taken place between the mid-1970s
and early 1990s.26 This shift occurred not just in one or a few of the developed countries but rather
in virtually every single leading industrial country. Is such a shift desirable and should the resulting
industrial structure be promoted or avoided? Prevailing economic theory provides a set of
ambiguous answers, which essentially depend upon a number of trade-offs between what is gained
and lost by shifting economic activity towards smaller enterprises. While this ambiguity cannot be
easily resolved, in this paper we have attempted to identify at least the most important of these
trade-offs. The empirical evidence from linking growth rates to changes in the industrial structure
suggests that the ongoing shift towards smaller enterprises tends to promote rather than retard
economic growth. 27 Those countries that have introduced a greater element of entrepreneurship
have been rewarded with additional growth. 28 It is now the task of policy makers also seeking to
reward their economies with additional growth, to re-formulate policy in harmony with the shift
from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy.
                                                                
26 See the country studies included in Acs and Audretsch (1993), Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) and Thurik (1999).
27 Carree and Thurik (1998 and 1999) provide analyses showing the consequence of lagging behind in this restructuring
process in manufacturing. Using a sample of 14 manufacturing industries in 13 European countries and 13
manufacturing industries in 12 European countries, respectively, they find that, on average, the employment share of
large firms in 1990 has a negative effect on growth of output in the subsequent four-year period.
28 Thurik (1996) shows that the percentage growth of GNP is explained using a structural shift. This shift is captured by
the difference between the annual percentage growth of value-of-shipments of large firms (with employment of less
than 500 employees) and the annual percentage growth of value-of-shipments of small firms (with employment of at
least 500 employees), using data for three distinct time periods: 1988-1990, 1989-1992 and 1990-1993 for all twelve old
member countries of the European Union. See also Audretsch and Thurik (2000) where some calculations are presented
showing that a rise in the number of entrepreneurs, i.e., self-employed per labor force, leads to lower levels of
unemployment. They use data material of 23 OECD countries including the fifteen countries of the EU-15, Iceland,
Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and US for the period 1974 through 1994. Further
evidence is provided by Schmitz (1989) and Nickell (1996). Schmitz presents a theoretical endogenous growth model
which relates entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. He shows that an increase of the proportion of
entrepreneurs in the working force leads to an increase in long-run economic growth. Nickell studies the effect of
competition on the development of productivity of firms. He finds that an increased number of competitors is associated
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